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tEuthanasia' and Dying Well Enough• 
Paul Ramsey 
In o rder to think straight 
about the question of the m oral-
ity of "euthanasia," I want first 
of all to convince you that: 
1. It is better if you do not 
know the Greek language, or the 
root meaning of the word. 
2. You do not need to learn 
how to demonstrate that, while 
to kill someone directly (or with 
direct intention) is damnable, 
you are excusable if you kill 
someone only indirectly (or w ith 
indirect voluntariety). 
3. You do not need to deploy 
SUbtleties like saying you are 
accountable for another's d eath 
if you were the active agent of it, 
but not accountable if you were 
/XIIsive while the d eath occurred. 
4. You do not need to prove 
to the waiting world of philoso-
Phers or theologians that there is 
a crucial moral distinction to be 
*This article was the first of ~our Bampton Lectures in Amer-
Ica on "Christian Ethics and 
llodern Medicine," given at Co-
lumbia University in November, 
1975. 
. ~au/ Ramsey is professor of re-
1Wion at Princeton University 
lllld is the author of The Pat ient ~erson, Fabricated Man, and 
Ethir.s of Fetal Research, 
PUblished by Yale University ~-
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drawn between acts of omission 
and acts of commission even 
though the consequence is the 
srune. 
5 . You do not need to puzzle 
for very long over the m eaning of 
the distinction between "ordin-
ary" and "extraordinary" medi-
cal means of saving life - the 
first supposed to be morally 
mandatory and the second sup-
posed to be dispensable, both in 
past Christian medical ethics and 
in th e views of m ost physicians. 
These distinctions may be im: 
por tant to take up in other con-
nections - I happen to believe 
som e are - but neither separate-
ly nor together do they serve to 
solve or dissolve or even to clari-
fy th e question of euthanasia. In 
particular, to frame the question 
in terms of omission and com -
mission, passive or active eutha-
nasia, direct versus indirect kil-
ling, o rdinary versus extraordin-
ary m eans - and even our wob-
bly use of the term "eu thanasia" 
- only serve to confuse moral 
discourse. Yet it seems nearly im-
possible to dislodge such language. 
The title of this article is taken 
from a recent study pamphlet 
issued by t he General Synod 
(Church of England) Board of 
Social Respons ibility.! "Man 
should be enabled to 'die well,' " 
is the theme of that pamphlet. It 
37 
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goes on to say: "This is the liter-
al meaning of the word 'euthana-
sia' and, if we were starting 
afresh , there would be a good 
case for using this word to ex-
press our common concern for 
the welfare of the dying . But this 
is no longer possible, since the 
word has now become estab-
lished in popular usage with a 
more precise m eaning." 
That "more precise"- and cor-
rupted - meaning, I suggest, is 
that human beings should some-
times choose death as an end. 
The choice of one 's own death as 
an end is now the meaning 
packed into the word " euthana-
sia." Therefore , it occurs to us, 
when discussing the morality of 
the matter , to attach certain 
predicates that describe the man-
ner and means to death as a 
chosen and choice-worthy end. 
· We speak of "active" or " pas-
sive" euthanasia, of " directly" or 
"indirectly" disposing a patient 
to death, of whether death came 
by acts of omission or by acts of 
commission , by action or by re-
fraining. 
I would get rid of all those 
terms. We are misled to them by 
our po pular and irreformable 
usage of the word "euthanasia" 
- for choosing death as an end. 
Since we canno t restore the word 
to its original meaning, I t hink 
we simply must speak of the im-
morality of euthanasia and of t he 
morality of " dying well" - or, 
more soberly , of "dying well 
enough ." That may be to beg the 
question, or at least to anticipate 
a conclusion. But ther e is little 
38 
wrong with that among re :lers 
who are even now on the VI tch. 
It is often . said . that ceas 
oppose death and letting c' 
" indirect euthanasia," wh 
intervene, ' to start or hast 
dying process would be ' 
euthanasia." It is importa 
we entirely reject this lru 
and not solely because 
subtle suggestio n freque1, 
tr~duced that an apolor 
the morality of letting d if: 
a reluctant euthanasiast. 
ternatives are simply l 
" dying well enough" (dec, 
never chosen either as e · 
means) and choosing de<i 
end (and in that, he who 
the end ch ooses the me<. 
g to 
are 
~ to 
the 
1rect 
that 
1age, 
the 
:1 in-
;:, for 
only 
'1e al· 
ween 
itself 
or as 
as an 
10oses 
also). 
The language of direc 1direct 
was . carefully honed tradi· 
tiona! moral analysis in fder to 
sort right from wrong 1 quite 
different kinds of dilerr. ' as than 
the one we are now cm .dering. 
That language is proper! used in 
the case o f indirect th ·apeutic 
abortion (where a phy cian re· 
moves a cancerous , . erus in 
order to save a worn •1 's life, 
knowing full well tha he also 
kills the unborn chil< with~n} 
and in the case of coiL eral civil 
damage in acts of wa targeted 
upon legitimate militar) _tar~e:~ 
In t hose cases, direct an<.l mdlr . 
intentionality o f di rect and m· 
·th the direct effects have to do Wl ts 
t wofold (or manifold) effec 
· or flowing from a single ac twn, 
from a s ingle act of the wi_ll, :;~ 
geted upo n some good whli~ t· 
( d ' ' ind1rec agent foresees an so 
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ly" wills or permits) some evil 
side-effects. 
The only instance in which 
such language and its moral 
meaning need be invoked in dis-
cussing the question of euthana-
sia is a minor one. It is also very 
obscure how fac tually to analyze 
what is being done in that in-
stance. I refer to the use of pain-
relieving drugs which are sup-
posed also to be life-shortening. 
That, indeed , is an instance in 
which from a single volition and 
action two effects are (ambig-
uously) foreseen to foll ow. 
Clear Moral Analysis 
The moral analysis is clear 
enough. Any physician knows 
whether he is trying to relieve 
suffering or trying to bring on 
death. His aim is the former 
even if he knows that he is als~ 
doing the latter . No one doubts 
that he should relieve pain and 
SUffering, even if a shorter life 
for the patient is an " indirect" 
~ult of the medical care he 
UUtiates. 
. Once in an interdisciplinary d~ussion a scientist friend of 
~lne - a proponent of eu thana-
be111 on utilitarian grounds wh o r , leves we should comparatively 
:u~~ hum~ li~es in their 
chnmg tra]ectones, slowing 
10111
e • hastening others .:.... was ~king fun at the "absurd" dis-~ion between the direct and 
:curect results of pain-relieving 
lUgs. I asked him what he 
:UOUld think if we had drugs t o 
did eve suffering that certainly 
dea not shorten lives or hasten 
th. He replied that he'd op-
pose funding the research to dis-
cover any such way to deal with 
the suffering of the dying. My 
rejoinder was, " Then you can tell 
the difference between the direct 
or intended and the indirect or 
unintended of the twofold e f-
fects of medication!" As be-
tween the two, he simply wanted 
physicians sometimes to bring on 
death , and inciden tally , of course, 
relieve the suffering of the dying. 
In the case of pain-relieving 
drugs, the moral grounds for 
approving their use even if death 
comes sooner is clear enough, 
and, I believe, convinc ing. As 
stated in the Anglican pamphlet: 
There is a clear distinction to be 
drawn be tween rendering someone 
unconscious at the risk of kill ing 
him and killing him in order to 
render him unconscious . ... There. 
is a dPcisive difference between the 
situatu .... , of a medical practit ioner 
who se pat ient d ies as the resul t of 
an increased dosage of a p ain-killing 
drug and who wo uld use a safer 
drug had it been available, and that 
o f a public executio ner, in s tates 
which employ this means of carry ing 
out the death pe nalty , who' ch ooses 
drugs for the ir d eath-inducing prop-
erties. Two rive rs may take t heir 
rise at a ve ry li t tle distance from 
o ne anoth er on a moun ta inous pla-
teau, but thi s sligh t diffe rence may 
determ ine th at th e o n e fl ows north 
and the oth er south.2 
What is in doubt is the fac tual 
situation. To suffer unrelieved 
pain is also debilitating and life-
shortening. " Giving the right 
drugs is not tantamount to kil-
ling the patient slowly . The relief 
of pain itself may well lengthen 
life: it will certainly enhance 
it."3 "This is not 'protrac ted 
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euthanasia' .. . as it has been 
called, but a way of enabling 
someone to live actively up to 
the moment of death."4 
My point, however, is to urge 
that we jettison the expressions 
"direct" and "indirect" from dis-
cussions of euthanasia unlesss it 
is very clear that we are talking 
about this single issue: the use of 
pain-relieving drugs. Except for 
this sort of medical decision, the 
alternatives are choosing death as 
an end and the means thereto 
also (to add "deliberately" or 
"directly" says no more than 
a lready stated by the word 
" choose") or to let die and to help 
the dying to die well enough 
(and that entails no choice of 
death, direct or indirect, as end 
or means). 
The remaining verbal distinc-
tions - the alleged difference be-
tween "passive" and "active 
euthanasia, between acts of omis-
sion and acts of commission, be-
tween action and refraining 
- can be taken together for com-
ment. Again, those may be the 
right-making or wrong-making 
features in the analysis of some 
moral questions, but not of the 
treatment of terminal patients. 
Of course, euthanasia is an active 
choice of death as an end and of 
the means thereto. Death is 
brought about by commission, 
by an action. For Jews and Chris-
tians - and for other religious 
outlooks as well - euthanasia is 
wrong because it is wrong to 
choose death (to say " deliberate-
ly" or "directly" adds nothing). 
But the alternative policy is 
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not correctly characteriz l as 
"passive" euthanasia (a J ssive 
choice of death as an en0 .r by 
negative means). Death's ( .lSe is 
not advanced by acts of m ssion 
or by refraining. Death's · ase is 
advanced by the diseas state 
itself, which it is now m ·ss to 
fight. 
It is rather another cs e that 
is advanced by choosing 
native course of action. 
doctor says, "There's 
more to be done," he r· 
context, "There's noth 
to be done to cure or t c 
particular life," not 
more to be done" a: 
except to switch to inal 
sivity, omission, refrain 
entirely misleading," t . 
alter· 
hen .a 
::> thing 
i nS, in 
more 
.ve this 
othing 
,Iutely , 
Jn, pas· 
, " Itis 
, .Angli· 
can pamphlet correct! :- affirms, 
.,e cura· 
uthana· 
1d medi-
Jeen." 5 
"to call decisions to c: 
tive treatment negativ• 
sia'; they are part of g 
cine, and always havr 
The switch from cun• ve treat· 
ment is followed imm• tately by 
an exceedingly active ;· ~actice of 
medicine - "commll. · tOns" of 
many sorts- in carir £· for the 
dying. In words dra't':1. from a 
Protestant hymn, fron: trying to 
"rescue the perishing'' o ne turns 
to "care for the dying. ' Not even 
the "turn" from what was fo~­
merly the indicated treatment JS 
an inaction, much less t he care 
and treatment to which one then 
turns Still that turn is not a turn 
towa;d death as a goal of human 
actions No one chooses death as 
end or. means. We choose ra~he~ 
to care for the still-living dyJOgf. 
t . " 0 That is "affirmative ac wn 
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the highest order. One refrains, 
of course, from what was former-
ly the needed curative treatment, 
but that is promptly replaced by 
the now needed caring treat-
ment. The latter policy is as 
active as the former. Both serve 
life and neither chooses death as 
end or as means . 
Hospice a 'Way-Station' 
Cicely Saunders, M.D., is the 
leader of the Hospice movement 
in Great ·Britain. The word Hos-
pice, used in place of Hospital or 
Sunset Village, means a way-
station for pilgrims. She once re-
marked: 
"I am in the happy position of 
not being able to carry out drastic 
life-prolonging measures because we 
iust do not have the facilities at St. 
Joseph 's. Other people have made 
the decision, at a prior stage, that 
this is a patient for whom such pro· 
Cedures are not suitable or right or 
kind. This makes it very much 
easier for us than for the staff of a 
busy general ward. I think that it is 
extremely important t hat the deci· 
sion be made by a person who has 
learned all he can about the family, 
about the patient himself, and 
about the whole situat ion. The fur· 
ther we go in having special means 
~t _our disposal, the more important 
It IS that we stop and think what we 
are doing .... I have had much cor· 
respondence with t he former chair· 
lllan of the Euthanasia Society in 
Great Britain, and I took him round 
St. Joseph's after I had been work· 
ing there some eighteen months. He 
came away saying, " I didn't know 
You could do it. If all patients died 
IOIJiething like this, we could dis· ~and the Society." And he added, 
I'd like to come and die in your !o~e." I do not believe in tak ing a 
. hberate step to end a patient's 
hfe- but then, I do not get asked. 
,1977 
If you relieve a patient's pain and if 
you can make him feel like a 
w anted pe rson , which he is, then 
you are not going to be asked about 
euthanasia .... I think that eutha· 
nasia is an admission of defeat, and 
a totally negative approach. One 
should be working to see that it is 
not needed. " 6 
A reporter asked Dr. Saunders 
why, even for emergencies, they 
did not have an " intensive care 
unit" at St. Joseph 's or St. Eliza-
beth's. She replied, "Why, all we 
have here is intensive care!" That 
says better than I can why we 
should resist calling the practice 
of dying well enough by such 
names as "passive" or "negative" 
euthanasia, and why we should 
never let ourselves be put in the 
position of having to prove that 
refraining is somehow better 
than acting, and be less account-
able if evil comes about only 
through our omissions. 
II 
The immorality of choosing 
death as an end is founded upon 
our religious faith that life is a 
gift. A gift is not given if it is not 
received as a gift, no more than a 
gift can be given out of anything 
other than kindness or generosity 
(to give out of flattery or dupli-
city or to curry favor is not a 
gift). 7 To choose death as an end 
is to throw the gift back in the 
face of the giver; it would be to 
defeat his gift-giving. That, I sup-
pose, is the reason suicide and 
murder were called " mortal 
sins," deadly states of the soul as 
surely as is despair over God or 
despair in face of the forgiveness 
of sin. 
41 
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So also, religious faith affirms 
that life is a trust. And not to 
accept life as a trust, to abandon 
our trusteeship, evidences a de-
nial that God is trustworthy, or 
at least some doubt that He 
knew what He was doing when 
He called us by our own proper 
names and trusted us with life. 
We are stewards and not owners 
of our lives. 
Or again, if, as Christians, we 
believe that d eath is the "last 
enemy" that shall be destroyed, 
then to choose death for its own 
sake would be a desertion to the 
enemy, and a kind of distrust in 
the Lord of life and the Lord 
over the death of death. 
Many people today think it 
odd to believe that illness unto 
death or the gradual decay of our 
mortal frames are signs that God 
is calling his servant home. That 
seems to make nature God. 
"Vitalism" is the usual charge. I 
suggest, to the contrary, that 
such a view is no more an oddity 
than to believe that the birth 
of a child is God's gift of life 
and a sign of hope . Both are, 
to the seeing eye, biological 
processes. Both are capable of 
being ·~rationalized," and as faith 
recedes, humankind seizes do-
minion : babies made to order, 
death by choice. To the eyes of 
faith, however, God gives and 
God takes away. And it is no 
novel conclusion of religious 
philosophy that God always 
works through "secondary 
causes." If that is true, then 
some current assaults on " vital-
ism" or " physicalism" are liable 
42 
(if successful) to run God ent ·ely 
out of the world. 
Medical~Moral Policy 
) OSe 
f al-
fur-
not 
in-
;ard-
) n a 
• is a 
does 
noral 
{h" if 
s end 
we red 
Prof. 
What, then, does one c 
in a medical-moral policy 
lowing to die o r refusal ' 
ther treatment- if that 
dominion over human I 
stead of trusteeship or s t 
ship, if that is not base· 
fundamental de nial that 
gift and a trust? What, th• 
one choose in a medic, 
policy of "dying well en 
he does not choose deat. 
or means? No one has u 
this question better th 
Arthur Dyck of Harvarr 
sity. A person " d oes nc 
death but how to live 
ing." Physicians d ecid· 
patient should live wh 
be-tubed or as com fc 
p.ossible. Such choi( 
" how the last days of 
patient are to be spel 
goes on to say, are "nr 
niver· 
·boose 
ile dy-
in principle from the • 
make throughout our 
how much we will rest 
now a 
dying, 
1ble as 
about 
e dying 
' Dyck 
tifferent 
>ices we 
·!e S as to 
o w hard 
we will work, how lit • or hoW 
much medical intervl tion we 
will seek or toleratf' and the 
like ."8 Or, I would dd, like 
choosing orange or , pie juice 
for breakfast, to smok or not to 
smoke, or between the shore or 
the mountains for a vat ation. 
These are life-chowes. TheY 
are indeterminate d ec isions in 
that it is difficult to say hoW we 
make the m, or to justify one op· 
But· tion rather than ano ther. 
none is a choice between life or 
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death, or who shall live and who 
shall die. Indeed, that choice is 
no~ ou~ of our hands. The dying 
patient 1s, of course, in a narrow 
p~sage _no longer thinking of 
gomg to the shore o r to the 
mountains. His choices indeed 
are limited . Still , his choice of 
how to live while dying is a life-
choice; it need never be a choice 
of death as end or means. One 
compares a certain state or con-
dition of dying with another, one 
treatment with another, or treat-
ment with no treatment. All such 
decisions are consistent with 
accepting life as a gift and a 
trust. None seizes dominion over 
h~man life and death. We may be 
rnlStaken ; indeed, we may be bad 
trustees and exercise our stew-
ardship of God's gift of life 
wrongfully. Still, worthy or un-
worthy, we re main trustees 
making choices among the good 
of. and for life and do not lay 
~hum to dom inion over human 
hfe. As Dyck puts it, "choosing 
~ow_ to live while dying" stands 
111 dtametrical contrast to actions 
that "h · 
. ave the Immediate inten-
tion of ending life (one 's own or 
ano~er's). " Only the latter " re-
PUdiates the meaningfulness and 
Worth of one's own life." Only 
the latter " irrevocably severs any 
":!ual or potential contact with 
0 
ers and shuts them out of 
one's lif , 0 e. nly the latter usurps 
dorn· · 
• 
11110n or throws back the gift 
: the face of the giver. Only the 
tter chooses death as means or 
' end. The former is a life-choice 
one ' &till arn~ng the choices of a life 
received. 
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III 
There was a final point listed 
at the beginning of t his article 
namely, you do not need to puz~ 
zle for very long over the mean-
ing of the distinction between 
"ord · " d " mary an extraordinary" 
means of saving life. 
Past moralists used the term 
"ordinary means" to save life as 
an ethical category ; it meant im-
perative. They used the term 
"extraordinary means" as a term 
of m oral permission; it meant 
electable or morally dispensable 
means. Like all other offense-
terms or terms of approval, these 
terms are , as classifications in-
curably circular until filled ~ith 
concrete or descriptive meaning. 
So " f " , orgery means wrongful-
ly writing someone else's name 
not simply writing someon~ 
else's name. " Lying" means 
wrongfully vocalizing an untruth 
not singing "I die! I die!" if on~ 
is a Wagnerian opera singer. 
" M d " ur er means wrongful kil-
ling, not just any killing.· We still 
have to ask, what sorts of cases 
count as these wrongs? 
A discussion of what consti-
tute~ ordinary or extraordinary 
me?Ical means is like debating 
which cases of writing someone 
else's name constitute forgery 
wh~t killings are wrongful, o; 
which words uttered, inconsis-
tent with the mind's apprehen-
sion, are to count as lying. In all 
these cases, we have to ask 
" Wh ' at counts? What are the 
m orally relevant features?, " 
when we judge a specific situa-
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tion or action to fall under one 
of these terms. 
When we ask this question, I 
suggest that the morally signifi-
cant meaning of ordinary and ex-
traordinary medical means can 
be reduced almost without re-
mainder to two components. I 
further urge that the older lan-
guage be abandoned, and that in-
stead we should speak of (1) a 
comparison of treatments that 
are medically "indicated" and 
expected to be helpful, and those 
that are not medically indicated. 
In the case of the dying, that in-
cludes in all cases, or in most or 
many cases, a judgment that fur-
ther curative treatment is no 
longer indicated. 
Right to Refuse Treatment 
Instead of the traditional lan-
guage, still current among physi-
cians, we should talk about (2) a 
patient's right to refuse treat-
ment. Indeed, this en tire lan-
guage about ordinary and extra-
ordinary means was developed 
by past moralists specifically to 
apply to conscious patients who 
are certainly not in the " process 
o(dying."9 So they spoke of not 
leaving ·home and traveling great 
distances to obtain life-saving 
treatment, of a justified revulsion 
to disfigurement, etc. 
Why do I say that the meaning 
of "ordinary /extraordinary" can 
be reduced "almost" without re-
mainder to these two compo-
nents? Why some hesitation in 
recommending that we drop the 
traditional language? Certainly 
not because of any doubt about 
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the rightfulness of stoppil fur-
ther curative treatments the 
case of the dyi.~g. 
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The· translation "a tt ient's 
right to refuse treatn 1t" en· 
thrones, to the contrar.. an arbi-
trary freedom. It ascrib to sub-
jective decisions the •>wer to 
make medical intervent ns right 
or wrong. Choosing 0 1 refusing 
treatment is submitted o volun-
taristic determination In con-
trast to that, the disti r .:tion be-
tween ordinary and e·, traordin-
ary means was a way o' referr~n_g 
to refusals that are simply sutcl· 
dal and those that m &.i not be. 
The search for the specific mean· 
ing of imperative or electable 
means of saving life (objectively 
relative to a patient 's medi~al 
condition or to his human ctr· 
cumstance) excluded a patient's 
right to choose death as end 0~ . 
means. He chose to remain a 
home, not to travel far away; he 
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chose against disfigurement. 
These were all life-choices; none, 
a choice of death as end or means. 
Certainly no patient has a 
right arbitrarily to refuse treat-
ment with medical assistance. 
Physicians, too, have con-
sciences, and integrity in their 
professional judgments. There-
fore, I add that the search for ob-
jective grounds for describing a 
treatment as ordinary or extraor-
dinary (objective, even when rel-
a~~e to · the patient's dying con-
dition) had also the virtue of not 
turning physicians into "animat-
ed tools" (if someone prefers 
Aristotle's definition of a slave 
' over the words "technician" or 
"instrument") who simply assist 
a _patient to attain anything he 
WIShes. Instead, a patient's need 
and real claims upon our care 
were to be read off the human 
and medical reality of his case, 
not from his expressed wishes 
alone. His freedom and dignity 
do not encompass the right to do 
wrong, a right to assault the val-
ue of his own life with medical 
assistance. Treatments are not 
electable because elected de-
sirable because desired. ' 
. If there is a right to die (a 
right to choose death as an end), 
then that implies "as is normal :th rights, a correlative duty on 
e part of others to secure to ~e individual the exercise of his 
~t."lO Not yet have we as-
::ned the right to die, the right 
. choose death as an end (if that 
~ the meaning of "a patient's 
light to refuse treatment"), the 
Iaine moral status as the right to 
life. If the claim were verified 
that an individual has a right of 
arbitrary self-determination in 
the matter of life and death, then 
if he chooses to live, there is a 
duty upon others to protect his 
life and, equally, if he chooses to 
die there is a duty upon others to 
assist his dying. I, therefore, fear 
that the translation " a patient's 
right to refuse treatment" moves 
too far in the direction of sub-
jective voluntarism and auto-
mated physicians. Having gone to 
that state of affairs in the matter 
of abortion, let us not do so as 
we approach medical euthanasia. 
After this excursus, return to 
the first component meaning and 
translation of "ordinary /extraor-
dinary," namely, t reatmen t in-
dicated or no further curativ~ 
treatment indicated in the case 
of the dying. We should now be 
prepared to see that this wording 
does not mislead. It rather directs 
attention to the objective condi-
tion of the patient, and not to 
the wishes of any of the parties 
concerned - not even the pre-
viously expressed opinion (as re-
ported) of Karen Ann Quinlan. 
Treatment indicated or no fur-
ther treatment indicated are not 
such by anyone's stipulation. 
Within whatever margin of error, 
these are objective medical deter-
minations. That means that dis-
agreement - for example, be-
tween physicians and the family 
of a comatose patient - may be 
real disagreements over an objec-
tive medical situation and about 
what should be done in a particu-
lar case. 
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At the same time , a compari-
son of treatments, or of treat-
ment with no further curative 
treatments, is objectively relativ~ 
to the patient's present condi-
tion - not to some notion of 
"standard medical care" in a 
physician 's mind . A routinized 
understanding of "ordinary /ex-
traordinary" is the "security 
blanket of som e physicians who 
nevertheless have been known to 
call some ethicists " absolutists"! 
In this article I have been con-
cerned simply with the clarifica-
tion of terms, to the end that the 
prohibition of euthanasia can be 
more fully understood. This is a 
firm principle or moral norm 
that should govern medical care. 
I myself have suggested that 
there may be "exceptions" to 
t he rule against hastening or 
causing or . choosing death.11 A 
littl e flurry of debate once ~wirled around those exceptions. 
1 do not now enter the lists to 
defend them. My point has rath-
er been a far more important 
one, against the trend that is 
clearly evident in contemporary 
discussions to weaken the prin-
ciple prohibiting choosing d~a~h. 
Ldose language, I believe, 1s Its 
source. 
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After reviewing both tradition-
al teaching and traditional Chris-
tian thinking on positive eutha-
nasia, the author attempts to es-
tablish a Christian basis for posi-
tive euthanasia in highly selected 
circumstances. The author and 
editor publish this with the in-
tention of inviting comment 
rather than settling an issue. 
Ms. Cahill is a member of the 
religion department of Boston 
College. 
A ~Natural Law' Reconsideration of Euthanasia 
Lisa Sowle Cahill 
Respect for the value of 
human life and care for its pres-
ervation in a state of physical 
Well -being have traditionally 
motivated the practice of medi-
cine in Western societies. Because 
of the relatively recent but very 
lapid advancement of medical 
technology, it has become com-
monplace to observe that the 
Proper affirmation of that re-
8pect and the adequate fulfill -
ment of that care are perplexing 
ethical issues. It is often no easy 
matter for the physician to deter-
llline how best to honor his obli-
gation "to render service to 
hUJnanity with full respect for 
the dignity of man." 1 
Some of the moral uncertainty 
which surrounds our current per-
ceptions of the relation of the 
sick to the healthy (especially to 
members of the health care pro-
fessions) and to alternative 
courses of treatment, might be 
alleviated by careful reflection 
upon the meaning of "the sanc-
tity of life" and its implications 
for action. Difficult questions 
about life and death ought to be 
considered in light of the totality 
of the human person to whom 
this principle has reference. Bio-
logical life is said to be "sacred" 
because it is a fundamental con-
dition of human meaning. But 
physical existence is not an ab-
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